The EU Speakers' Conference has experienced a 'second youth' after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon by playing a 'quasi-constitutional' role in inter-parliamentary cooperation, and in particular by trying to exercise a rule-making function over the many 
Introduction
The EU Speakers' Conference was the first inter-parliamentary conference to be set up in the EU back in 1975, when it started to meet every year on a regular basis. This conference, although lacking express acknowledgment in earlier EU Treaties and protocols, I has recently experienced a 'second youth' when, after the entry into force of the After having explored potential alternatives to the Speakers' leadership, it concludes that the two Speakers' Conference's functions should be re-balanced. In other words, rather than focusing almost exclusively on its 'rule-making' capacity, the Conference should ground its 'quasi-constitutional' role on its coordinating function, to enhance the rational organisation of inter-parliamentary activities in terms of timing, agendas and ex-post supervision of the results. 
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The article also considers the domestic powers of the Speakers and the asymmetric position of the European Parliament's President. Here it is argued that the function performed by this conference is somewhat sui generis compared to other emergent interparliamentary conferences and venues that are normally policy-oriented, follow cluster of interests or are geographically recognisable (Fromage 2016: 749-772) . Indeed, the EU Speakers' Conference is neither meant to fulfil a joint parliamentary scrutiny role on the EU's fragmented executive (Curtin 2014: 1-32), i.e. a shared and collective scrutiny by the legislatures placed at the different levels of government (Cooper 2014: 2; Griglio 2016: 586-587; Eppler and Maurer 2017: 242-243; Griglio and Lupo 2018: 358-373) nor to create a sort of 'parallel' parliamentary diplomacy in the EU. III Rather, it plays an overarching quasiconstitutional role in that it tries to establish order in the complex and chaotic world of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU by exercising both a coordinating function and a (sometimes questionable) 'rule-making' function (Fasone 2016: 269-289) . In theory, this makes the EU Speakers' Conference a prominent actor in the wider set of interinstitutional relations in the EU, although in practice this potential is not fully exploited due to the peculiar features of the Conference itself.
It should be noted, in fact, that the very strength of this inter-parliamentary venue, namely its composition, is at the same time, a weakness. Indeed, while the Speakers of EU Parliaments and parliamentary chambers certainly hold the most important office within their own legislatures, they are characterised by very different powers across Member States and the European Parliament. Some Speakers must be impartial and, in theory, not affiliated to any political group: they cannot take a political stance nor vote; some others, instead, are a clear expression of the majority and tend to act in alliance with the Government. The first group of Speakers, when acting in the Speakers' Conference and, more generally, in supranational and international venues, are not entitled to vote on behalf of, or bind, their parliaments. This can prove to be a limitation to the effectiveness of the EU Speakers' Conference, which as it is dependent upon national provisions, is not easy to overcome.
In contrast, the second group comprises Speakers that, despite being able to take a political stance in both EU and foreign affairs, nevertheless are unable to give voice to the Ad hoc working groups, established on only a few occasions, can be set up to look after specific issues -for instance the quality of legislation. These only remain in operation for a limited, and pre-determined, period, so that these share no similarity to structured committee systems, with a specialisation by subject-matter, found in the EP and national parliaments. Thus, it is clear that the Conference is not a permanent body, i.e. it is not summoned or in session beyond its yearly meeting, nor does a permanent secretariat exist, and has limited decision-making capacity given the consensus rule, its internal organisation and the frequency of its meetings.
Weaknesses (and strengths) of the Conference's composition
Other limitations to the decision-making capacity of the Conference derive from EU 
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The ability of parliamentary delegations to bind their own parliaments, through the position they adopt within inter-parliamentary conferences, is always problematic, according to whether a prior 'mandate' has been voted by the parliament to direct the delegation (which happens in few cases) or not. Normally, this 'mandate' could by no means be equated to that approved in some parliaments, like the Danish Folketing, towards their governments -i.e. there are no real accountability mechanisms among MPs, nor could their deviation from instructions be sanctioned. However, from time to time a committee competent on the subject-matter, or the plenary as a whole, expresses a certain stance on an issue to be discussed later on within an inter-parliamentary venue. 
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Conference carry out a review of those principles and rules subsequently adopted, after two years, and to submit the results of such review (again) to the Speakers. The first meeting of the new inter-parliamentary conference, held a few months later, strictly followed the principles set out by the Speakers' Conference and entrenched two provisions in the rules of procedure that enhanced the rule-making authority of the Speakers. Article 8(2) affirmed that any amendment to those rules 'must be in accordance with the framework set out by the Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments' and Article 9 assigned to the EU Speakers' Conference the final say over the recommendations adopted within 18 months by the ad hoc review committee on the rules of procedure.
When the review took place, however, the final decision on updating and amending the rules of procedure was taken by the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP-CDSP itself, at its meeting in Rome on 6-7 November 2014; a decision that was later on also endorsed by the EU Speakers' Conference in Rome, on 20-21 April 2015.
The fact that the new inter-parliamentary conference regained jurisdiction over its own rule-making demonstrates that this body enjoys autonomy and is able to make the choices that are more consistent with the features of the peculiar field in which it is called upon to 
Conclusion
Year on year, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Speakers'
Conference has taken up and been able to strengthen its 'quasi-constitutional' role in inter- The EU Speakers' Conference in Lupo and Fasone, eds (2016) . I Article 9, Protocol 1, indeed, can be considered as a weak legal basis for the role taken up by this Conference. The article refers to the co-determination by the European Parliament and national parliaments of the 'organization and promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union'. II As described in this paragraph, the 'role' refers to the actual operation of the EU Speakers Conference, while by 'function' it is meant a set of activities and tasks in principle ascribed or conferred to the Conference. III On parliamentary diplomacy as para-diplomacy outside in the EU context see Stavridis 2017: 368-387. IV On the gradual engagement of national parliamentary assemblies with European affairs through the Speakers' Conference, see the Keynote speech given by Elia (1975) Romaniello (2015) and Baraggia (2016) . X In the XVIIIth term of the Italian Parliament, started in 2018, the representation of the ruling parties and of the opposition by the Speakers of the two Houses has instead been inverted: while the Speaker of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Roberto Fico, is a representative of the Five Stars Movement, part of the ruling coalition, the President of the Senate, Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, has been elected as a senator of Forza Italia, currently in the opposition. At the moment of the election of the two Speakers, on 24 March 2018, however, the political situation was very blurred and the formation of the new government yet to come. XI The conclusions are drafted in such a way as to ascribe them to the individual Speakers rather than to the Conference as a whole. XII The only exception is represented by the decision to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Conference, to be proposed by one of the Speakers and to be seconded by two-thirds majority of the members (Art 3(6) of the Guidelines). Under Art 5(2) of the Guidelines, any member of the Conference is entitled to disclose their disagreement with the position endorsed by the majority of the Conference and should state clearly that that opinion has not been confirmed by the Conference as a whole. An interesting case of 'dissenting opinion' emerged in the aftermath of the EU Speakers' Conference held in Rome on 20-21 April 2015. The Speaker of the Hungarian National Assembly sent a letter to the Speakers of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate contesting the fact that the conclusions of the Conference had been really adopted by consensus, according to the Conference's Guidelines. In particular this Speaker objected to the allegation contained in the conclusions addressed against Hungary of the violation of fundamental rights. 
